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CODING IN.STRU TTCTI1ONS
For the purposes of this study of local conflicts two assumptions are to be made.
First, it is assumed that there are only two principal parties, "antagonists," or
"adversaries" involved in any given conflict; and, that all other direct or indirect
participants therein are "third parties" to the.conflict, regardless of their effect
upon its eventual development or outcome. The term "antagonist" is used throughout this
codebook to designate the one principal party under consideration at a given moment,
while the "adversary"' is used in this context to refer to the other.
An "antagonist" comprises, further, the sum of the ruling "regime" (i.e., government
or effective elite) of this principal party, plus whatCever "general population" is in its
political jurisdiction or effective control. These distinctions are adhered to through-
out the codebook, and specific items (or, questions) are phrased in terms of each.
For me conflicts, it depends very much upon one's interests or frame of reference,
whom one designates as the principal parties or "antagonists" thereto, and whom as in-
volved "third parties.' For our purposes, however, it is the ori7nal two parties to
the local conflict, as they define themselves, which are to be defined as the
"antagonists.
Thenceforth, any international, supra-national, regional, national, or autonomous
sub-ational force or organization that becomes involved in the conflict, directly or
indirectly, in partial or neutral fashion, is to be regarded as a "third party" to the
conflict, for purposes of answering this codebook.
One special or exceptional case in this regard is that of a revolution, rebellion,
or uprising (etc.) against a colonial (or effectively colonial) government. In this case,
-the colonial government itself and the rebel or revolutionary organization are -to be de-
fined as the principal parties to the conflict; and the metropolitan country, as a "third
party" with which the colonial government has formal security and economic alliances.
While this requirement may seem both arbitrary and a gross distortion of reality, it is
necessary to ensure the comparability of our data base, and will, it is expected, prove
a fruitful, if novel, approach to the analysis of such conflicts.
The codebook proper is divided into nine sections. Section 1 is composed exclusively
of questio:s that pertain either to the conflict in general or to the relationship between
the ntgnists, and that are to be answered as such. In sections-2 through 9, however,
each antagonist is dealt with separately; each question therein is to be answered for each
antagonist. Thus, at the top of page 6, you are asked to identify the antagonist or
adversary for whom you will answer the questions on that same colored sheet throughout the
remainder of the codebook. The questions in these sections, you will notice, correspond on
-iii-
opposite sheets throughout; and which antagonist you choose to place on either side (or color)
is of no difference, so long as consistency is maintained.
The manner in which the questions are to be answered brings us to the second major
assumption of this study.
It is assumed that, in their life-cycles, all conflicts pass variously through the
following phase scheme:
Phase I: Pre-Military Phase--wherein the conflict is conceived in non-military terms;
Phase II: Military-But-Pre-Hostilities Phase--wherein the conflict is conceived by
the antagonists in military terms (deployment, mobilization,etc.) but no actual
hostilities, other than random or accidental, are being con4 ucted:
Phase III: Hostilities Phase--wherein organized and systematic hostilities have been
undertaken to resolve or settle the conflict;
Phase IV: Military-But-Post-Hostiltities Phase, or termination of hostilities phase--
wherein hostilities are broken off, but no settlement of the conflict has
been achieved; thus, the conflict is as yet conceived in military terms, and
could precipitate renewed hostilities;
Phase X: Post-Military Phase, or, settlement phase--wherein the particular conflict
at hand ceases to be conceived of in military terms; this phase is, then,
analogous to Phase I, and can occur but once in the life-cycle of a par-
ticular conflict.
It is to be noted that the life-cycle of any particular conflict may involve tran-
sitions forward, backward, or in a feedback loop, with the result that there is no set
or established "course" for any given conflict to follow through the phase scheme.
-iv-
Further, within any Phase(s) III of a conflict, there may occur "escalations" or
"de-escalations" of the on-going hostilities. For our purposes, such occurrences are con-
stituted by only a gross change, initiated by either side, in the existing "rules of the
game' (explicit or tacit) governing the conduct and limitation of hostilities.
In simplified form, then, the dynamic model of conflict looks like this:
E D
The broken lines indicate possible "courses" that any given conflict may follow in going
from any one Phase (or, in P-III, from any one sub-phase) to another. It is to be expected,
then, that each conflict will follow its own idiosyncratic course through this model, and
the codebook has been structured to accomodate this expectation.
-v-
Thus, you are asked to identify, on page 1, the phases through which this particular
conflict has- passed. It may, for example, have followed such a course as this
P I P1I - P III - R IV - P III - E*I - P IV - P V
if hostilities had broken out, terminated, broken out again, and escalated, before being
terminated, and a settlement finally reached.
In this particular case, with eight phases and sub-phases, there were seven "transitions"
from one phase to another. It is the number of such transitions that have occurred in a par-
ticular conflict which is indicated by the T's in the left hand column of page 1. And it
is at each of these T's that the great majority of the questicxs in this codebook are to
be answered.
Thus, each case undergoes a certain number of transitions, each of which occurs at the
end of the preceding phase. Wherever the response structure to any given question indicates
that it is to be answered at every T through which the conflict has passed, you are asked
to respond in terms of the conditions existing at the very end of the previous Phase or
sub-phase (ie., at the end of P I for T-1, at the end of P II for T-2, etc.) It is to
be noted that if the particular conflict in question has passed, for example, through
seven transitions, then T-8 through T-12 are to be ignored throughout. They are there
simply to accomodate more complex conflicts.
v7i -
Wherever the response structure to a question does not specify responses. for every T
J.,where it is but a single column), the question is a single response item of a
general nature, applying throughout the history or course of the conflict, and may be
answered as such.
Finally, it is asked that you fOrgiv2 the seeming complexity of these coding in-
structions. They will, we feel, become obvious in their intent and menaing as you glance
through the codebook. And lest you be intimidated before proceding, we would note that
the overwhelming majority of the questions herein are of a non-quantitative nature, re-
quiring for an answer only the thoughtful and sober judgment of an individual intimately
acquainted with this conflict. Only that thoughtful and sober judgment, and the -per-
severance of you, the coder, can provide the conpleLe and reliable data on this conflict
that is necessary to make this .study a success.
Appended to this codebook is a list of references containing pertinent quantitative
data and - ich, hopefully, will be of use to you in locating specific pieces of information.
ie references are listed under substantive headings comparable to the questionnaire
format, and are, within these headings, listed in order of their general utility or in-
clusiveness in terms of that subject matter.
IDENTIFICATION OF PHASES
identify Phases (including escalation(s) and de-escalation(s) witin P III) through which
the conflict (has) passed:
(Note: identify Phases by P I, P II, etc. Within Phase(s) il, identify escalations
bY E I, E II, etc., and deescalations by D I, D II, etc. For our purposes, an escalation or
de-escalation is indicated by a gross change, initiated by either side, in the exisiLin.g
rules of the game"--explicit or tacit--governing the conduct and limitation of hostilities.)
Phase
P I
T -1
T-2
T-3
T-4
T-5
T-6
T-7
T-8
T-9
T -12--
Date Started
yr.) Event Mark Beginning o hase
Initiator
which side)
2.
1. COVER SHEET DATA
(i.e., questions characterizing the conflict in general, or the relationship between the
antagonists thereto.)
1-1. Geographic Locus of Conflict
1.
2.
.3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
North America
Central America-Caribbean
South America
West Europe (including Greece)
E ast Europe (including Yugoslavia)
Middle East or North Africa (including Cyprus and Afghanistan)
Africa South of the Sahara
South Asia (incl. Pakistan, India, Ceylon)
East Asia and Southeast Asia
1-2. Predominant natural environment of the conflict area (check one)
1. Flat-dry (less than 15 in. rain/year)
2. __Flat-moderate (15 -5Oin. rain/yr.)
3. 'Flat-wet (more than 50 in. rain/yr.)
4. Mountainous-dry
5. Mountainous-moderate
6. Mointainous-wet
(Ref.: Ch. 6 of S.J.Dietchnan, Limited War and American Defense Policy
Cambridge, 1964)
mf
m~
ow
Wl
3.
SCharacterize e nature of the prevailing pol it ical relationship between the
antago-nists within the past 20 years (previous to T-I)
. Cooperacive
Competitive
3. E:xploitive (i.e., colonial, etc.)
1-4. Characterize the nature of the prevailing military relationship between the
antagonists within the past 20 years (previous to T-1):
1. Peaceful
.2. Sporadic, random hostilities
3. Prolonged, organized hostilities
1-5. Classify the predominant nature of this conflict for these antagonists (check one)
1. Colonial
2. Interstate
3. Internal
4. Both interstate and internal
1-6. How long, in months, has this specific conflict (or, this particular recurrence
of this conflict) persisted since it went to Phase II (i.e., set T-1 equal to 0).
1.
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-1l T-12
1-7. Do there exist "ideological" differences between the antagonists (i.e., differences
between their policy-relevant views of the world and of the desireable) at this point
in the conflict?
1. Extreme differences
2. Mild differences
3. None
T-l T-2 T-3 -T-5 -7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-6l T-12
4.
8. Does the conftict at this pcinu- involve any specifiable piece of real estate (or, the
control of a piece of real estate)?
NT- T-2 T3 T-4 -5 - - T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
1-9. Size of area involved (or at stake) in the conflict at this point in thousands of
square miles (indicate zero, if no real estate involved);
1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-9 T-10T-ll T-1-2
1-10. Size of population in area involved (or at stake) in conflict at this point, in
thousands (indicate zero if no real estate involved):
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-5 -6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-li T-12 =
1-11. Has this conflict ever been brought before any agency of a rnational oraniza tion -
(as, Pan-American Union, OAS, OAU, etc.)?
1. Yes
2. No
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-l1 T-12
w
1-12. Has this conflict ever been brought before any agency of an international or ization
(i.e., League of Nations or U.N.)?
1. Yes
2. No
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-11 T-12
w
10
5.
S Who introduced this conflict to the n tentional
cons ider ation?
1. One of the antagonists in
the conflict
2. A "neutral" nation
3. A "Great Power"
4. Other party
5. NA (not before an inter-
national organization)
organ iation for its
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T8 T-9 T-10 T-11 T-12
1-14. On the basis of what principal complaint was this case brought before this
international organization (check onl one)?
1. Complaint of aggression,
ntervention, occupation,
or threats thereof
2. Demand for self-
determination
3. Claim to territory or
status
4. Denial of human rights
5. Claim of violation of
other rights under inter-
national law or treaty
6. NA (not before an inter-
natioal organization)
S 
t~L~ I a
T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4V T-5 -T--6
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Identify this a ntagonist in the conflict
2. DNMOGRAPHIC DATA FOR ANTAGONIST
2-1. Characterize the single overriding ideal of the regime's cultural heritage, or of the
cultural heritage from which it comes:
1. Non-resistance, or renunciation
2. Rationality, or instrumental self-seeking within constitutional limits
3. 'Aggressiveness, or struggle (or competition) without limitaticn of means
4. Efficient administration, or the philosophy of "the bee is nothing, the hive is all."
2-2. Characterize the single overriding preferential mode of conflict resolution in
the cultural heritage of the regime, or in the cultural heritage from which it comes.
1. Renunciatory (yield to opposition)
2. Conciliatory (compromise with opposition)
3. Dictatorial (dominate opposition)
4. Adjudicatory (submit controversy to group decision)
2-3. Major racial grouping to which this antagonist is generally considered to belong.
1. white
2. brown
3. black
4. yellow
5. mixed
7.
Does the regime belong to the same racial grouping as the general population?
Yes
No
2-5.. Racial homogeneity (Caucasoid -- Mongoloid - Negroid) of this antagonist:
1. 'Romogeneous (80% or more of one race)
2.. Heterogeneous (less than 80%' of one race)
2-6. Linguistic homogeneity of this antagonist:
Homogeneous (mraj-ority of 85% or more; no single significant minority)
Mildly heterogeneous (majority of 85% or more; significant minority of 15% or less)
Strongly heterogeneous (no group 85% or more)
2-7. Religious homogeneity of this antagonist:
1. Strongly homogeneous (90% or more of population of ore religion)
2. Mildly homogeneous (70-90% of population of orie re Ligion)
3. 1__Mildly heterogeneous (50-70% of population of cne religion)
4. Heterogeneous (no single religious group with 50% of the population)
2-8. Dominant religious group: indicate that religion with greater membership among
the antagonist than any other:
1.~~ Pate s tan
2. Catholic
3. -Eastern 0
4. induU
5. B_ ud dhis t
6. Muslim
7. Jewi sh
8. Confucian
9. Other - S
10. -Other - d
t
r thodox
ame as adversary
ifferent from adversary
1.
2.
1.
2.,
3.
U'
OR
W
-7.
2- Does he reg me belong :o the same racial gropinr g as he geneora I popuia
Yes
2,
2-5. Racial homogeneity (Caucasoid -- Mongoloid - Negroid) of this antagonist:
1. Homogeneous (80% or more of one race)
2. Heterogeneous (less than 80% of one race)
2-6 Linguistic 1homogeneity of this antagonist:
1. Homogeneous (majority of 85% or more; no sile significant mtiority)
2. Mildly heterogeneous (majority of 85% or more;. significant minority of 15% or less)
3. Strongly heterogeneous (no group 85% or more)
2-7. Religious homogeneity of this antagonist:
1. Stronglyv homogeneous (90% or more of population of one religion)
2. Mildly homogeneous (70-90% of population of one religion)
3. Mildly heterogeneous (50-70% of population of one religion)
4. Heterogeneous (no single religious group with 50% of the population)
2-8. Dominant religious group: indicate that religion with greater membership amonlg
the antagonist than any other:
1. Protestan
2. _ Catholic
3. Eastern 0
4. Hindu
5. Buddhist
6. Muslim
7. Jewish
8. Confucian
9. Other - s
10. Other - d
t
r thodox
ame as adversary
ifferent from adversary
83
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1 1-2 3 1- T 5 T T g
-9 Fercentage of total population able 4-o read(i~e. , iterate) in at least one language:
1 4igh,(80 or m
2 Medium(40-793 Lo (beow 0 )3~ o W J OW 4 0-
4 NA (no general pcpulation)
2-10. Daily newspaper Circ io, per 1000 population:
1. Hi gh (300 and over)
2. Medium (100 -299)
3. Low (10-99)
4 . Ver y -low(be l 10 )
5. NA (i.e., no general population)
2-il. Deaths from domestic group violence pcr 1000 population for this antagonist:
1.
2. NA (i.e., no general population)
2-12. Size of area in political jurisdiction or actual control of this antagonist, in
thousands of square miles:
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-Ll T-12
2 :3. Total population in political jurisdiction or actual control of this antagonist
in thousands:
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-Z47 T -5 T-6 TC-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-11l T 12
-3
a piece or rezal estat is in~volved in tis conf e i t,_ i
n m trritic1al bounr-
cartes e amed~ by ts an~-
zn as ts own?
'aI~ pne teritria boun--l 'AI
dar ie claimed b y this an-
tagonist as its own?
3 ot wti anld withou01-t theC
doundaies c laie d by this
antagonist as its own?
(no) relall estate involved)
L1 -2 T-3 T -4 - 3 T -6 1-7 T-8 T- 9 T-10 T T 1I2
f1o a ce of real estate is involved in this onflt, what perentg of this2nagnststotal cla.ied Land ,area does this re0resent? I
estate involved
T T-2 T-3 T -4 T - '5 6 T-I 1 7 >9 T-1. 0
If a ece of real estate is involve(d in
tagonist s total claimed popil.ation ces
estate invo ved)
this con icfti wh'!Pat(perc ag th
this~~ rereen? n
I .
1-1 -2 1-3 T- T T-6 -- I
f a piee of real estate Is involved in 31is
arai
coii
7 - 1re1!
1i -, e - LSp o ra e a is in
thee specifte areaJ is cuiyctrl
- A -1 2 -v '3
'em
#*A
-.7,
L
3 2 7 - .--~ ->5 -- - - -, -
~j 
I
w
Ow
s actually controle by ths ntgos
i
9.
Tf a piece of real estate is involved in this cnflct, iS I t
S thin the territorial bon-
daries c'amed by this an-
tagonist as its own?
2. Outside the territorial boun-
Caries claimied by this an-
tagonist as its own?
3. Both within and without the
boundaries claimed by this
antagcnfiLst as its own?
4. NA (no real estate involved) A_
T-1 T -2 T -3 T_-+T- T6T7T8 T-9 T-10' T-l 1 T-12
2-15. If a piece of real estate is involved in this conflict, what percentage of this
antagonist's total claimed land area does this represent? (Indicate NA if no real
estate involved)
T T-3 T-4 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-Ll T-12
2-16. If a piece of real estate is involved in this conflict, what percentage of this an-
tagonist 's total claimed populaion does this represent? (Indicate NA if no real
estate involved)
T-1 T-2 T-3 T~-7+ T-5 T-1T T-8 -T-9 T-10 T-ll T-1.2
2-17. If a piece of real estate is involved in this conflict, what percentage of that specific
area is actually controlled by this antagonist? (Indicatc NA if no real estate involved)
T-1 T-2 T-3 T- T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-1.2
2-18. If a piece of real estate is involved in this conflict, what percentage of the opulatin
in that specifc areC a is actuall- nyo e by this antagonistY
no real estate involved)
(lndicate NA If
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T- T-9 Ta T-'h
1i)~
V~~t rc1i.atcn n, centag. cit tota l rcp -A --v li cJI i ~s crOUO
-)- CD I on) Til.T-2 +3 TV -5 T-67-7 T ~ h9 T-11C) I IV4
"t
upLj
ow
liR
owt
410
go
tow
a,
10.
2-19 Urbanization percentage of total population in cities over 20000
1. ig fmore rhan 353
2 Mdum (betvween 12 and 335%)
Low (less than 12%)
4. T\A (ie. , no genera~
population) 
~T4 T-5 T-6' T-7 6 T-
!J .
qw,
3 , NCC )3 T S. C R NT O IS T
sction, GNP1' is used to ) idicate eitr Tss nation a -product" or
"o F economic product,'" wcv i app licable it refers to The annuai ecoil 1-
pro-'t or resources of the anaonist.;
2. Tn ray cases, the answers to marny of the foil wi ng qus Lions wil not vary
ficJ.t atly throughout the conflict. If such 3i the case, answer the quesi
at T-1, and indicate "the sam a hroughout. Wher gnificant changes area believed
5o h3vfe ocCurTEd in any item, answer the question at every such pnt.L
aw
SEconomic Develpment status of this antagonist:
SDevo loped (sei- sustaining; GNP/cap of $600)
ntermed fate (near self-sustaining)
Uderdeveloped (sustained growth in 1 years)
very underceveloped (no such pros pc t)
NA (no economy as such)
3-2. Gross economic (or national) product in $ millions
economy as such): per 
y cl ('idicate NA
T--1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-,3 T9 T-10 1 T12
3 Growt1h rate of GN--annual (indicate NA if no :onimny assuh)
Ti 1T-2 T 3 Ti T 5 6 T- T T-9T
3 Ra t of tnf i n the e4o7my o-- kh pst-
10
'I
-----------.1~ 2-2 r~3 I' --. 1- - A -~/ -, - .1-I
1.
2.
3.
1
5.
S
a.
S
1.
'p
a
S
S
Aw
ao
Ow
am
if
11.
3. ECONOMIC AND TRANSPORTATION DATA. OR ANTAGONIST
Note:
1. In this section, GNP is used to indicate either "gross national product" or
gross economic product," whichever is applicable; it refers to the annual. economic
product or resources of the antagonist.
2. In many cases, the answers to many of the following questions will not vary
significantly throughout the. conflict. If such is the case, answer the question(s)
at T-1, and indicate "the same" throughout. Where significant changes are believed
to have occurred in any item, answer the question at every such point.
3-1. Economic Development status of this antagonist:
1. Developed (self-sustaining; GNP/cap of $600)
2. Intermediate (near self-sustaining)
3. Underdeveloped (sustained growth in 10 years)
4. Very underdeveloped (no such prospect)
5. ._NA (no economy as such)
3-2. Gross economic (or national) product in $ millions per year (indicate NA if no
economy as such):
1. I II
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-11 T-12
3-3. Growth rate of GNP--annual (indicate NA if no economy as such):
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-l2
3-4. Rate of inflation in the economy over the past year (indicate NA if no economy as such)
1. T
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-11 T-12
1 2
- '-' - .-- - (i S' 3 per ye:) (iniat 9) sonomy as such)
3 6. 9L
, 6 tPer centae Uf GNP originatLig in (md lee La NA if no@ economy assh
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4T 5 T-6 r-7 T- T' 9 T-1 T
3 7x Pereuage af GNP (per year)
NA i no economy as such):
to du~ eel a n c emi Cal i.ndus t6 ries (indir 12k12
T-1 T-2 T-3 T+ T5T-6 T-7 T- T-9 T-10 T T 2
3-8 Total productin
as such):
of steel in thousands of tons per yar (indicate :A if no econoy
T-1 T-2 T-3 T- T-5 T-6 T- 7 T-3
- TA
9 11
3-9. What percentage
(indicate NA if
of this antagonst's
no economy as such)
GNP is repcesented by its exoort trade?
41~I 3> 3 T- F- -6 v-7 s i) A
3I ~v~iCi aid receiveud (in ;
N S
IC,
6 -7 8 1 'NI -~
711 7 :61(771 ut CViQThtC a Ic] r . C--' .4 -*- --~-i 1r o X/eIvedI (in
I, ----- / -w
'ar I:
-- ,1 -
N
""
00
3-l t
*0
04
C
a
S
a
3-5.
13
12.
3- Per capita GNP (in $ per ear) (indicate NA if o conomy as such)
T-1 T-, -' T-4 T-5 T- T- Tu8 9 T-9 d T-1 1 T-1E-2
3-6. Percentage of GNP originating in agriculture (indicate NA if no economy as such):
.............. .... ..
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T- T-8 T-9 T-TU T-ll T-12
3-7. Percentage of GNP (per year) in durable goods and chemical industries (indicate
NA if no economy as such):
1. L . ~ ~ . L -
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-T T-5 T-6 T-7 -T~~ T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
3-8. Total production of steel in thousands of tons per year (indicate NA if no economy
as such):
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 C-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-l1 T-12
3-9. What percentage of this antagonist's GNP is represented by its export trade?
(indicate NA if no-economy as such)
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
3-10. Total foreign aid received (in $ millions per year)
T-l T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
3-11. Total foreign economic aid received (in $ millions per year):
T-1 T-2 T--3 T? T-5 T-6 T7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-llT-12
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ni gn aid receve a. s prc g C 3e Sr N f r iz ani ecea;id:
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1 2 1 - 3 ' -T5 T- T T8 T- T-1 T
e3 c-cs this party have what is genraly regarded as3 a rogressive" a sr uc1ur1?
3. .;'A (Jie no economy as
Revenue Of regime as * pexcen.iage oL G-NP (:nd cate NA if no economy as such):
2- T 3 T5 T-6 T-7 T8T9 -10 T, T I 2
3-. 5 Expend itures of r egime as percentoage Cf GNP (indicate NA tf no ccnomay as such)
16t t-z I-3 1>4 T-5 T- T'-7 T-8 T- T-10 T T 2
3-16. Expeditures for social welfare service n
n cl di; health, education, pubIc hous
no economy as such) :
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3A21 Foreign aid received as percentage of party's o GP plus foreign aid receivd:
(Indicate NA if no economy as such)
T-I T-2 T-3 T~4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T11 T-12
3-13. Does this party have what is generally regarded as a "progressive" tax structure?
1. Yes
2. No
3. NA (i.e., no economy.as such)
t I I .I I a
T-1 T-2 3 T4 T-5 TT-8 T-10 T-l T-12
3-14 Revenue of regime as percentage of GNP (indicate NA if no economy as such):
T-1 T-2 T-3 T4T-5 T-6 T-7 T8T9T1 -1T1
3-15. Expenditures of regime as percentage of GNP (indicate NA if no economy as such).
3-16. Expenditures for social welfare services by this regime as percentage of its GNP,
including health, education, public housing , welfare benefits, etc. (indicate
NA if no economy as such):
I. ___2T-3_T_6_T_7_-8_12
T7-1 T-2 T-3 7-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-1l T-12
3-17l Total military defense budget (in $ millions per y ar) (indicate NA if no econmy as such)
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
I i
ALUdlOrit..2 \ ').1:
T2 T' - 7 T -8
3-9. Trotal inta try
NA if: no ecn
deftense buLd ;t2
my a s
@1: Vt? forelgn aid rcei VeI
such):
T 2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T4 T-7 T-h 8 -9 T-10 T-T t2
3-2() Agi§ Cultural
3-21. Emp l yment
empioymeunt as
iin JTfldci.:sttly
pCL. QCT±L33~6 2
as prcentage o ' la t L 0
a es 15-64: (ind6ate
age 15-64: indicate
ow
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NA i n G n9 )3
1-i 1 2 T-3 T4 Tr T 6 7 T 8 -9 T-1 T
3-22. Unemployed as percentage C population -ige 15 ~6' (incUr ci! a N if no o neral
T4 2 3 4 5 6 7 .8 9 T O
33. Unemocloyment ar Qalaemloymentt of
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i. Total military dteese budge as percentage e GNP (iTdicate NA if no ;co ncy
3 -]L 9 Total military defense budget as percentage of GNP us foreign aid received (ind ck5e
NA if no economy as such):
T.1 T 2 T-3 T- T-5 T T-7 T- T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
3-20. Agricultural employment as percentage of population ages 15-64: (indicate NA if no pop n
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7T-8 T-9 T-10 T-11 T1~-12
3-21. E.mployment in industry as percentage of population age 15-64: (indicate NA if no pop'n.)
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T~6 T-7 T 1 T-9 T-10 T-_l -12
3-22. Unemployed as percentage of population age 15-64:(iodicate NA if no genleral popul'ation)
T-1 T-2 T-3 T- T-5 T- T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-1l T-12
3-23. Unemployment or mal-employment of local "intellectuals" in this antagonist's
general population: Is this a:
1. Marked problem
2. Mild problem
3. No, 'or negligible problem
4. NA ,i e no population,
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-il T-12
1 .
i I
- LAKS 7' ji~ A' it CT
3 , Nu e off pvd
0isposal t this antbTgoni:
estate3 is involxved):
f*~ £- 7 T-Si9I-OW-~L
hUghwayl (in Ctsans) Wich are controlle by n ' or a
stY in theA conflict area(s) (indicate NA if. no real
Vo
Tl T-2 T-3 -t4 T- 1 6 T-7 T4 T-9 T-10T 7..(7
Amber of 2iles Of ratJlroa 'I (inthusnd)
7 t in
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(indicate NA if
-63 1-4 TV> -6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-I l - 2
Number of airports capable of handling heavy
are controlled by or at d.i' s posal o1 Cf Che (2
piston -ircraft (DC -3 or larger)
ntagonist in the cofic t't area2I(s
1
C-1 1-2 T-3 Y-4 Tr- T-6 T-7 T- T-9 1-,O TLI T-2
N Ier of airports capabe
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I, 3 A. . ~ U -,
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3-24 Nomads as percentage of pop ulaion: indicat NA if no gene ral population)
-L Il AL L- d.
3-25. Number of miles of paved highway (in thousands) which are controlled by or at the
disposal of this antagonist in the conflict area(s) (indicate NA if no real
estate is involved):
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T -5 TT-9 T-10 T-1l T-12
3-26. Numtber of miles of railroad (n thousands) which are controlled by or at the disposal
of this antagonist in the conflict area(s) (indicate NA if no real estate involved)
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-1 T-ll T-12
3-27. Number of airports capable of handling heavy piston aircraft (DC -3 or larger) which
are controlled by or at the disposal of the Atagonist in the conflict area(s)
T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-0 T-LL T-12
3-28, .aber of airports capable of handling jet transports ,which are controlled by or
the disoosal of this antagonist in the conflict area(s):
1. T
T-1 T-2 T-3 T~4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
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3-29, Nber of seapoErts (or copaab fL elites) canable of handling ocesn-go-ng
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T--7T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
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4. POLITICAL SYSTEI_ AND STRUCTURE OF ANTAGONLST
4-1. Characterize this antagonist: (check. oe)
Independent national government
2 Colonial government
3. Internationally appointed trusteeship or interim government
4. Rebel or insurgent organization.
4-2. Date of independence of this antagonist as a nation:
1. Before 1800
2. __ 1800-1913
3. 1914-1945
4. After 1945
5. NA (not an independent nation)
4-3. Modern colonial ruler (present or most recent) of this antagonist
1. Britain
France
Spain
4. Portugal
5. Netherlands
6. Belgium
7. ital~y
9. Nne in modern times
4-4 Exective stabiliy (i.e., nmbe of chief x or as of government
within previous ten years) (indicate NA if ree rganiz3tion)
1
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4-5. Characterize type of government or political structure:
1. Political democrac --autonomous
executive, legislature, and
courts as well as interest
groups, political parties,
and mass media __I
2. Tutelary democracy--structur-
al forms and norms of
democracy present, but
concentration of power
in executive and bureau-
cracy - democratic goals g
3. Modernizing oligarchy--
dTmocratic constitution
absent--power concentrat-
ed in hands of military
or bureaucracy - goal of
modernization (especially
economic) __ _ t* t
4. Totalitarian oligarchy--
extreme concentration of
power in elite, extreme
penetration of society
by policy -- goals may be
nationalist or global
revolutionary
5. Traditional oligarchy--
usually monarchic or dynastic,
based on custom rather
than statute;goals are
primarily maintenance goals 
_-A
6. NA(i.e., rebel or insurgent
organization with no gov-
ernment as such) IT-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-lO T-ll T-l2
a t a anot Ier
{-5&-oTT -IT O
- 37 T6i 7 T-8 T-..9 TAO T> 2-
- .
y . y
. (i.e,, r,3 oranization)
T 1 T2 T 3 T- T-5 T-6 T 7 T-8 T-9 T) T T 1 132
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.9 ,)[ J.s\
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4-6. Current status of executive as opposed to other branches of government:
1. Doi-nant (throughout govern-
ment establishment)
2. Strong (dominance limited
to purely executive
functions)
3. Weak (dominated by another
branch of government, by
political party, etc.)
4. NA (i.e., rebel organization) a I a I
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 .T-10 T-Ll T-12
4-7. Current status of legislature:
1. Fully effective (co-equal
branch of government)
2. Partially effective (vir-
tually dominated by
executive)
3. Wholly ineffective
(rubber stamp)
4. None -- no legislature
5. NA (i.e., rebel organization)
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
4-8. Curent status of judiciary:
I. Fully effective (co-equal
branch of government)
2. Partially effective (vir-
tually dominated by
executive)
3. Wholly ineffective
(rubber stamp)
4. None -- n.o judiciary
5. NA (i.e., rebel organization)
a a
- T T T- T-_7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-11 T-12
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4-9. Character of bureaumra or administrative organs:
1. Modern (generally rational
and effective, recruitment
largely on basis of
achievement)
2. Semi-modern (largely
rational, limited
ef ficienc y)
3. Transitional (ex-colonial,
largely rational, adapt-
ing to own social
institutions)
4. Traditional (largely non-
rational, ascriptive re-
cruitment)
5. NA (i.e.,rebel organization)
2 T 3 1I Ia
T-1 T-T-3 T-4T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-lO T-11 T 12
4-10, Did the present regime attain power by established constitutional procedure?
1. Yes
2. No.
3. NA (i.e. rebel organization)
t i_-L -. A. .L _--
PiL T T- T 7 T - l T-12
4-11. Recruitment to leadership. Characterize the values dominant in recruitment of
psonnel into functional roles in the political structure of this regime:
1. Elitist--recruitment wholly
according to ascriptive
criteria (i.e. ,membership
in a class, caste, pol.
party, etc.)
2. Moderate--recruitment largely
but not wholly according to
ascriptive criteria
3. Non-elitist--achievement or
ability criteria dominate
recruitment process
a I 4L ~A ____£L ~
I A ~
T-1hYTJ~T~~3 T 6 TZ7 T : T-1 T-12
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4-12. Ideological orientation of regime:
1. Left wing (Communist, etc.)
2. Moderate (Democratic,
Socialist, etc.)
3. Right wing (Military,
Fascist, etc.)
- T
T-l T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-l1 T-12
4-13. Political orientation of regime toward internal affairs:.
1. Traditionalist or reactionary.
2.. Moderate - pragmatic
3. Revolutionary
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T T-7 T-8- T-9 T-1O T-1l T-12
4-14. Character of international policy of this regime:
1. Doctrinaire-leftist
2. Doctrinaire-rightist
3. Pragmatic-moderate
4. None
L -ai
T-l T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-i1 T-12
4-15. Communist orientation of this regime:
Commun.ist-Soviet oriented
Communist-China oriented
Communist-Independent
Non-Communist
Avowed anti-Communist
-~-J-~______ I
p I I I I
B I ~ I I I
I I I. i - I I I I
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
.2
- 3 f 5 T- I T3 T-- 9 10
Qua o S1 e of regille '101O rts made by re.ime t) Tmtob 1)4 r It ne on7,IL
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- e
-2 3 4 T5 T6 T7 T8 T-9 T -10 T T 2I
4 8 o tc n cn o gnI p n
1: on or 7 oi i1I3-
S 1o -S:m c Itd-
ow e ) i -, Awn4 C .a. 1
2 n/
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2
22.
4-16. Leadership charisma within regime:
Pronounced
Negligible or none
T-1 T-2 T-3 'T-4' T-5 T-6 T T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
4-17. Mobilizational style o-f r'egime (ef f orts made by regime to mobilize general
to meet its established .political goals):
1. Fully -mobilizational (all
population)
2. Limited mobilizational (spe-
cific segments of society)
3. Non-mobilizational (opposes
or suppresses popular par-
ticipation in political
process)
4. NA (i.e. ,no general
population)
population
T-7 T-8 T-9 T-1 T-1 T 1
T- T T
T-l T-2 T-3 T~~~~~~- - - -. T8T9Tl -lT
4-18. Political integration of general population:
1. High (integrated polity, no
extreme opposition to pol.
system, or non-assimilated
groups) a a a
2. Medium (significant .minority
in opposition, or non-
assimilated) p a I
3. Low (non-integrated or re-
stricitve polity with majority
in opposition or non-assim.
4. NA (i.e., no general
population) I I
T-l T-2 T-3 T 4 T-5 T-6 T 7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-l T-12
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4-19. Freedom of press allowed by this regime:
1. Complete (no censorship)
2. Intermittent (occasional
or selective)
3. Internally absent (domestic'
censorship, but none on
newsgathering for foreign
dissemination)
4. Internally and externally
absent (strict domestic
and foreign control)
5. NA (no press) T- -1 ~
I _T__-4 _T _5 -T7 1- 9 T -9 T E0 T-41T- ~
4-20. Freedom of .group opposition allowed by this regime:
1. Autonomous groups free to
enter politics and oppose
government
2. Autonomous groups free to or -
ganize; limited in capacity
to oppose government
3. Autonomous groups tolerated
only outside politics
4. No autonomous groups
tolerated
5. NA (no general
population)
T-1 T-w:Y T -3 T4 IT-5 T6 -7T8T9T-lO1 T-liT1
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4-.21. Interest articulation by anomic (spontaneous) groups (i.e., mobs demonstrators ,etc.)
1. Frequent
2. Infrequent
3. None tolerated
4. NA (i.e.,no general
population)
TlT2T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T- -s- T-l T-l T-12
4-22. Interest articulation by associational groups (i.e., specialized structures of
interest articulation--as, unions):
1. .Significant politically
2. Insignificant politically
3. NA.(i.e..,no general population
T -l_ T -2 T -3 T- T -5 TWTT8T9Tl T-lT-12
4-23. Interest articulation by institutional groups (i.e., institutions performing other
social functions--as, church):
1. Significant politically
2. Insignificant politically
3. NA(i.e. ,no general population)-------------
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
4-24. Interest articulation by political parties:
1. Signficant politically
2. Insignificant politically
3. NA(i.e.,no general population
-- 4- 4- -- J -~- -~.-AJ ____
) T-3 
- T-9 T-lo T-lI T-12
)
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4-.25 Constitutional status of political parties:
1. Compectitive (no party ban
at all)
2. Partially competitive (se-
lective outlawry of parties
3. Non-competitive (no oppositio
parties allowed at all)
4. NA (no general population)
in
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
4-26. Effective party system:
1. One-party (no opposition) A
2. One-party dominant ( no
effective opposition) 
- -
3. One and one-half party (oppo-
sition significant but un-
able to win majority)
4. Two-party (reasonable ex-
pectation of party rotation
5. Multi-party (coalition or
minority party gov't normally
mandatory)
6. NA (i.e., no general
population)
T-1T- T- T4 T5 -6 -7T-8 T9 T-101T T-12
4-27 . Personalism within political parties (personality oriented):
1. Pronounced (all parties highly
personalistic)
2. Moderate (some personalism)
3. Negligible (no significant
personalism)
4. NA (i.e., no general
population)
I a a a a i a 1 ~
-4-: -8S=q- r-oLT _T-1- 
-T T--2TII
26
8 re) Centage ofj voting 2ge. popnlaion; I C >7)1 in> tC s eet oua otios ( ite NA if no eH d 1 
- r r o L iECtc s rjc 1ece tctnno v e r ee ra ))pu' ,L L io)
T~T 
. >7 1-8 119 - 1 T 1
tesC.-? -cie b ths r i n theJ
a pec!entage of the total vote cast t
cto xral ppulat ion):
m!ost racen: popular (oI n tiona)e lect us(indicate A if no elections ever held I uo
1 T1 T2 T-3 T-T 17 , 1 T- t '
3ectons
as cC'C'~~ 2§C 'f LCtotl cLjs C:ast in r
ecton Wer4 e 
- a'v.1 ;_1tCneld, Yor oel p I I pu Lefatb et ci'd , 17 1 no g1 0x2 
-? ;IC a 
- 1 ) )1 u 1
the mowt recenit 2 0bu
far n Ges 6idic a t e
OW
OW
lo
W
lo
a0
ao
X- 3 1-4 T- T-6 T- T-8 T-9 1-10 1 !J
or
noe
a ~n y v .o 1] S -g £ -Cpr e A
na tionalJ) eeC r 
let. ions ever held , or no0
t ot 
- o e eat in Q
geea populat ion):
r i: e"-'sL?Ok ms * .
-1< -. *- -~
.9' 1 
i.
I-1 T-2 1-3 T4 T-5 T-6 T-7 1- T- T
3 i aTr g -ist exIC pe r 1- f;y)ie -n(d a 1.Edtrship- " r is 1 .1in
N I-
CCCCC C-A f-P a ~ .4 . .3
a , j
1) 
'I
C ~.. 
I
8 A -
? .i 
r'
~C ~ 
' 
C
rFPF
*NP
A..
H 7>12
1- h . ho' A
lo
ft
w
to
W
NOW
ao
ow
'p
I1
EG
- A
26.
4-28. Percentage of voting age population voting in the most recent popular (or national)
elections (indicate NA if no elections ever held, or no general population):
T-l T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7T T- T-10 T-ll T-12
4-29, Votes received by this regime in the most recent popular (or national)elections, as
a percentage of the total vote cast (indicate NA if no elections ever held, or no
general population):
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-lO T-ll T-12
4-30. How many votes, as a percentage of the total votes cast in the most recent popular
(or national) elections, were received by all "Left Wing" parties? (Indicate NA if
no elections ever held, or no general population):
1. I
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
4-31. How many votes, as a percentage of the total votes cast in the most recent popular
(or national) elections, were received by all "Right Wing" parties? (Indicate NA if
no elections ever held, or no general population):
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-l T-12
4-32. Has this antagonist experienced a leadership "crisis" during this Phase?
1. Yes
2. No _______
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-11 T-12
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4-33. Has there occurred a change in the leadership of this regime, or a change in
regimes,during this phase?
1. Yes
2. No
a I a £ I I I I I-
T-1~~~~ T- -3T4T5 -6 T7 -8T-9 T-10 T-11 T-12.
4-34. Do outside manpower, motives, money, and other resources constitute the main
capabilities of this regime (i.e., would it collapse without outside support)?
1. Yes
2. 'No
jPL-I T-2 T-3 T-4 P-5---;JF A. T
4-35. Do outside manpower, motives, money, and other resources appear publicly (i.e.,
its general public) to constitute the main capabilities of this regime?
to
1. Yes
2. No (i.e., it is seen as an
independent movement or
force)
3. NA (i.e., no general
population) f a T
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
4-36. WTI t is the level of general popular support (among its populace) for the regime s
stated objectives in this conflict?
1. Generally high
2. Generally low
3. NA (i.e. ,no general population
a a I ________
I-~ ~
P- T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
.. ....... __ _
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4-37. What is the level of general popular support for the regime's specific policies
in this conflict?
1. Generally high
2. Generally low
3. NA (no general population) _T_ a Y T ' T T . T 2
T-l -T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 LT-T-11l T-12
4-38. Current attitude of local "intellectuals"toward present regime and its policies
in this conflict:
1. Generally favorable
2. Generally unfavorable
3. NA (no general population)
T-l T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-lO T-ll T-1
4-39. Post-dispute expectations by antagonist's general public, if "victory" is not achieved
by this side:
1. Optimistic
2. Pessimistic
3. NA (no general population)
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-1l T-12
4-40. Effect of conflict oninternal cohesion of the general population
1. Greatly increased cohesion
2. Sligh tly increased cohesion
3. Slightly decreased cohesion
4. Greatly decreased cohesion
5. NA (no general population)
:t
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
-I p -- K- --1- --
A -
Q AT Y :- n- s v
/ -I C- L Li- 
t r
/ --p -
C I ~j.. Li. -j I --- '- --- -
4. W,.-i-.-4...-....-
T 
-P 
--' 
-
--
-- ---L V ':.y
J? u L PI,- -, ol
..~ 
-i?'
9
'?
---r -~ -
-
-'. C-, 4-------------p. - ' c-~I ' >..VK,
F- -*-" V ---I -- -I r
-a nE11 C71- T- 'TT%
-F-
iis & so
-'1, _j )_"r D
-... 1 a nVa 17L2- d-J' r
A 0
--x---Al.
PtT ' Llt C
7 -
10 1p 11 l-.
C- ,153I
1; too -
1T3 A y ot C
K--
ZD L
,; Ev ?
29.
5. PERCEPTIONS AND POLICIES OF THE ANTAGONIST WITH
RESPECT TO THE CONFLICT
lHas this party been involved in organized violent conflict (i.e., war) with any
party other than the present adver sary within the past twenty years?
Yes
No
5-2. Does- this regime seekthe overthrow or destruction of the regime (or leadership)
adversary in this dispute?
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
5-3. Does this regime perceive the following interest as being at stake in this conflict:
the spread of its ideology?
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
5-4. Does this regime perceive the following interest as being at stake in this conflict:
observance of its commitment(s)?
T T T T- T T
T-l T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-l0 T-ll T-l2
1.
2.
1. Yes
2. No
1. Yes
2. No
1. Yes
2. No
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5-5. Does this regime perceive the following interest as being at stake in this
conflict: realization of an established and on-going policy?
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T- 1 T-12
5-6. Does this regime perceive the following interest as being at stake in this
conflict: preservation of national character?
- T - . T T T
T-l T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T- L1 T-12
5-7. Does this regime perceive the following interest as being at stake in this
conflict: gaining of prestige?
T T T T T 5 T
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
5-8. Does this regime perceive the following interest as being at stake in this
conflict: satisfaction of pride?
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
5-9. Does this regime perceive the following interest as being at stake in this
conflict: augmentation of its power?
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
1. Yes
2. No
1. Yes
2. No
1. Yes
2. No
1. Yes
2. No
1. Yes
2. No
.E
a
I
.
t
a
s
a
t
d
I
U
U
I
I
U
I
I
I
I
E
i
i
u
i
g
C
"
I
"
'
 
0
C
'
.
a
N
4
r
n
 
c
y
3
 
-
(
F
-
i
4
3
-
I
K
f
l
 
C
9
I
f
'
 
'
I
-
i
"
-
a
-
. 2
~
1
C
"
'
I
l
 
C
q
~
4
r
I
4
)
 
'
j
 
q
j
C
.
,
I
D
 
"
1
,
,
.
U
'
 
(
U
N
 
I
l
l
-
)
 
-
,
*
2
 
I
-
 
-
'
 
-
I
t
1
 
r
-
~
 
C
C
r
1
 
'
4
"
'
1
I
 
N
1
a
,
 
1
-
~
31.
5-10. Does this regim.e perceive the following interest as being at stake in this
conflict: security of ,or acquisition ofindependence?
Yes I a a I a a a a a
2. 1\O 0 a 
T-l T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-l T-12
5-11. Does this regime perceive the following interest as being at stake in this
conflict: territorial integrity?
1. Yes a a .
2. No 1 T- T
T-l T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T 9 T-10 T-11 T-12
5-12. Does this regime perceive the following interest as being at stake in this
conflict: its continued existence?
1. Yes a
2. No -
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-O T-1l T-12
5-13. How deeply is the present regime personally committed to achievement of its
publicly stated goals in the conflict?
Totally (i.e.,to the death)
Deeply, but flexible
Slightly
Not at all (purely
expedientia 1)
a I
T-l T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
5-14. Does this regime regard this conflict as an ideological conflict, "holy war,"
or crusade"?
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-l2
1.
1.
2.
3.
4.
1. Yes
2. No
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5-15. Is this regime's conduct of the conflict limited. Is this, in terms of his objective
military capabilities, a "limited" conflict or war?
T A -A
T-1 T-2 T-3T- T-5 _T-_6_ T -7 T- 8-9 T- 10 T-11 T-12
5-16. What portion of his available militaryranower capabilities has this regime
committed or allocated to this conflict at this point?
1. Less than 5%
2. 5-10%
3. 11-24%
4. 25-49%V
5. 50-69%
6. 70-90%
7. More than 90%
A -A-A
A a AA J
~ A A
T-1 T 4 T T
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
5-17. Characterize the principal or overriding terms in which the regime has rationalized
whatever acts of violence have been perpetrated by its forces in this conflict.
(Check one.)
1. Moralistic ("just", etc.)
2. Political or historical
3, Legal or judicial
4. Expediency ("necessary")
5. NA (no violence has occurred)
a a A A
_a _ . T.i...j, p T A A
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-Ll T-12
5-18. Does this regime feel free, given its pub1_c utterances, to accept lesser
solutions than those publicly demanded of its adversary? (i.e., does it feel it
can accept lesser solutions without thereby causing itself grave internal
consequences?)
1. Yes
2. No
1. Yes
2. No
3 - - _ -T _ 0-5 - -- --i -- - - 1 --- J
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5-19. Characterize the present outlook of the regime with respect to the conflict:
1. Die-hard (willing to fight
to the death to achieve
stated objectives)
2. Realistic-moderate (willing
to seek a negotiated
settlement or compromise)
3. Conciliatory (willing to
accept considerable losses
to end conflict soon)
W. a L L
A 4 I I a a
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
5-20. Overall balance of "will" (or, determination to persist in the conflict), confronting
regimeas compared to adversary (as adjudged by this regime, at this point):
1. Favorable
2. Even
3. Unfavorable
T T T a
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-lO T-ll T-l2
5-21. Is the likely outcome of the conflict, if the level of commitment remains constant,
as yet obvous to this regime, or to any significant elements within this regime?
-1a a T
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-lflT12
5-22. Post-conflict expectations by this regime, if "victory" is not theirs.
1. Optimistic
2. Pessimistic
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-11 T-12
1. Yes
2. No
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5-23. Distance in miles to the scene of the conflict from nearest border of this
antagonist (if area is within, or on border of, antagonist's territory or
claimed territory, indicate zero.):
T-1 7T-2T-3T4T5 T-T-7 T-f- -0 -lT
5-24. If the scene of conflict is within, or on the border of this antagonist's territory
or claimed territory, indicate distance in miles to this area from this antagonist's
capital (i.e., political and administrative headquarters):
2. NA (i.e., scene of con-
flict is outside these
borders)
TT- 2T-1 T-2 T.-3 T- T5 T6 T7 T8 T9 Tl lT-12
5-25. Does it appear to this regime that its adversary in this present conflict is
an: (check one)
1' Agent or puppet of some other
adversary or enemy of t
regime
.2. Autonomous or independent
force operating primarily
(if not wholly) on its own
3. Ar :mtonomous force main-
tained by support from
another adversary or enemy
of this regime
. ..... L ........ .... -- - -L
T-1 T-2T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
35.
5 26_. Characte-ize the general experience of this regime with formal treaty or other
legal arangements with the adversary in this conflict
Gnally atisfactory
.V aenera. iv -u  a F ti-a to r 2o~
,JN n sUChl expe'rnce
with adversary)
T -I T-2 T--3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T 7 T-8 T T-10 T-1l T-12
-27. Speed of comunications. with the adversary:
I. Rapid (a matter of hours)
2. Modeate (a matter of days)
3. Slow (a matter of weeks or
months) 
~LL
T - 2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8T- T-10 T-l T-12
5-28. Reliability of corrnunicaticns with adversary:
W,
at
m
1, High (established and
secure channels)
2, Low (no established channels
or security)
T7--1 T-2 T-3 T-4F T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-IL T-12
5-29 C 1 rdility of communications with adversary:
Hngh or complete
Low or none
W
U3
w
W
I*
J-
-;R-I 2 -1 - Lb- I 1 1, 2-6 T -7 T-9
35.
5-26. Characterize the general experience of this regime with formal treaty or other
legal arrangements with the adversary in this conflict:
1 Generally satisfactory
2. Generally unsatisfactory
3. NA (no such experience
with adversary)
- T 3 T T
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 TTU T-Ll T-12
-27. Speed of communications with the adversark:
1 Rapid (a matter of hours)
2. Moderate (a matter of days)
3. Slow (a matter of weeks or
months)
A
P 1 ~J.~JJL
* A a £ I I P
4
a a p
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
5-28. Reliability of communications with adversary:
1. High (established and
secure channels)
2. Low (-no established channels
or security) a I
T-l T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
5-29. Credibility of communications with adversary:
l High or complete
2. Low or none
T-l T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
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5-30 Classify the regime's principal attempts at resolution
to their primary character at this point (check one):
L Delay (no action, wait for
better conditions)
2. Constitutional (e.g.,
elections, etc.)
3. Judicial (e.g., adjudication
by impartial application
of law)
4. Political (e,g,, negotiation,
compromise, bargain)
5. Military (eg., dictation by
violence or threats of
violence)
of the conflict according
T - T
T-1I T -2 T--3 T-4 T5 -- 6 T -7 T -8 T 1 -10' T-1l T-12
5-31, Has this regime offered to resolve the conflict by cons
elections, plebiscite etc.)
1. Yes
2. No
titutional means-? (such. as
aAL-
T TT -Tr6 T - -T 10 Ti T-2
5-32. Has this regime brought this conflict before an agency of an international organization
for its consideration?
1. Yes
2. No
S 6 T a
T-1 T-2 T-T - T- T- T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-l2
5-33. Has this regime indicated to the adversary that the subject (or object) of this
conflict is negotiable?
1. Yes
2. No _ _ _A 
-- 
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T7T-8 T_-9 _T:1lOT-ll T-12
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37.
5-34. Has this regime made any attempt through diplomatic channels to negotiate a
settlement of the conflict?
1. Yes
2 . NoI 
I 4T2T2-oT-6 T-7 T-8 T. T T-0 T-I T-12
5-35. Has this regime offered the adversary bi-lateral negotiations (or a conference)
aimed at settlement of the conflict?
1. Yes
2. No 44 -
T-l T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5-6 T T-8 T-9 T-10 T-rl T-12
5-36. Has this regime ever attended bi-lateral negotiations to resolve the conflict?
1. Yes
2. No
3. NA (none held)
T-1 2 T-3 T-4- T- 5 TT- - T-T-9 T- l T-ll T- 2
5-37. Does this regime presently perceive escalatory or expansive action on its part as
likely to precipitate active (or further active)"Great Power"support for its adversary
in the dispute?
p p a pAA-I - a - A I A I
V A a a -l A T2T1T2T3T- 4 -!_5__T-_6_ _T- 7 T-8 T-9' T- 10 T-Il T-1
5-38. Characterize the general public opinion of the antagonist concerning the
adversary's political institutions:
1. Generally favorable
2. Generally unfavorable
3. NA (no general pop'n.)
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T 8 T 9 T-10 T-11 T-12
13 Yes
2. No
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38.
5-39. Characterize the general public opinion concerning the adversary's social
institutions:
1, Generally favorable
2, Generally unfavorable
3. NA (adversary has no
such institutions; or,
no gener-al population)
5-40. Characterize the general
economic institutions:
10 Generally favorable
2. Generally unfavorable
3. NA (no general pop'n.)
5-41. Characterize the eneral
religious institutions:
1. Generally favorable
2. Generally unfavorable
3. NA (adversary has no such
institutions; or, no
general population)
5-42.
14 Yes
2. No
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-1,1 T-12
public opinion conceia ng the adversary's existent or proposed
T-1 T-2 T-3 T T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-l T-12
public opinion concerning the. adversary's
-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8-T 9 T-10 T-1l T-12
7as martial law been declared by this regime in the conflict?
A a
30 NA (no power to declare it)
-1T2 T-3 -T-4- T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-1l T-12
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5-43. Has a state of war been declared by this regime?
1. Yes
2. No
3. NA (no power to declare it)
a T 2 a a a T T-
A aa a a 9
T-l T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-1l T-12
5-44. Does this regime generally apply the same legal standards and protections to
jural persons (i.e., legal entitites, such as citizens, corporations, etc.)
of its adversary as it does to its own?
a I a a a a . a a . A
2. NO a a
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
5-45. What legal.status is presently accorded the adversary's personnel by this regime?
1. Citizen of power not at war
with this antagonist
2. Conmon criminal
3. Traitor or rebel
4. Citizen of power at war
with this antagonist
5. War criminal
p 4 p a
a T a a 
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-11 T-l2
5-46. Hes antagonist declared a general amnesty policy for adversary personnel?
1. Yes
2. No
3. NA (no hostilities)
a 4 a a
T-1a a
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
1. Yes
/ "3
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6. FOREIGN OR EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF ANTAGONIST AND INVOLVEMENT
BY THIRD PARTIES IN THE CONFLICT
Note:
1. A "third party" or parties to the conflict may be any or all of the following:
(1) international organization (i.e., League of Nations, U.N.); (2) supra-
national organization (as, OAU, Pan-American Union); (3) regional security
organization (as, NATO, SEATO, Warsaw Pact); (4) independent nation(s);
(5) autonomous (or independent) rebel, insurgent, or guerrilla organizations,
or similar internal forces.
2. Colonial Governments (i.e., the regime in power in the colony) are, for purposes
of this study, regarded as principals (or antagonists) to the conflict having formal
security and economic alliances with the metropolitan country, a tird partL~o the
conflict, and which may or may not presently be a "great power.
3. The "great powers" are, for our purposes, the overwhelmingly dominant national
powers during the historical era of the particular case study.
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41.
6-1. Does this antagonist have a formal security arrangement or alliance with any
"great power"? (Note: if, in the case of a colonial government, the metropolitan
country is presently regarded as a "great power", the answer to this question is
yes; otherwise, it is no.)
1. Yes _____
2. No a . a a
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-11 T-12
6-2. Does this antagonist have a formal security arrangement or alliance with any
nation(s) other than the "great powers"?
1. Yes p
2. No - 4
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-11 T-12
6-3. Is this antagonist a formal ally of any "great power"which is openly hostile or
inimical to the adversary in this present conflict?
1~ Yesp__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
2. No p p
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-Ll T-12
4 Is this antagonist a formal ally of any "great power" which is also allied to the
adversary in this present conflict?
1. Ye:s a e A
2 . N o T 1
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-1l T-12
6-5. Is this antagonist being supported or aided in this conflict by any "great power"
which is openly hostile or inimical to the adversary in this pre-sent conflict?
1. Yes A a#
2. No
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
I 
t
~
l
i
 
I
i
 
1
1
1
1
1
0
 
I
i
 
m
i
i
i
 
m
i
i
i
 
a
i
m
.
 
i
i
0
0
'
/
~
'
(
H
V
.
I
2
 
S
1
1
'
-
-
1
1
 
2
t
1
C
U
)
'
V
 
"
A
'
I
4
42.
6-6. Has any "great power" specifically expressed its partiality for this antagonist
(and its claim) in this conflict? (Note: if this antagonist is a "great power"
has any other great power expressed partiality for it?)
1. Yes
2. No a a a
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-1 T-12
6-7. Has any "great power" stated that any specific increase in the intensity or scope of
this conflict at this point would result in its active intervention on behalf of this
antagonist?
.1. Yes
2. No
T- T T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-l 0T-l T-12
6-8. Are there "great power" defense facilities located within the established
jurisdiction of this antagonist?
1. Yes
2. No
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-l0 T-ll T-12
6-9. Has any attempt been made by this regime to invoke any available bi-lateral or multi-
lateral security arrangements on its behalf in this conflict?
2. No
3. NA (none available) T- a I
T- 1 T- 2 T- 3 T-4 T-3 T-6 T- 7 T-8T-9TT-~ilT-12
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43.
6-10. Has any regional or supra-national security organization been consulted and asked
by this regime to play -an active role on its.behalf in the conflict?
10 Yes
2. No
3. NA .(none available)
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
6-11. Has an international organization been asked by this regime to play an active
role in the conflict?
1. Yes a a a a 4 a
2. No j a .Ia
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
6-12. Is (are) there any third party (parties) involved in this conflict in an active
supportive role on behalf of this antagonist?
1. Yes
2. No T a T T T T T-7 a 
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
6-13. Is an international organization involved in this conflict in an active supportive
role on behalf of this antagonist?
1. Yes a a a a a a a a
2. No _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-l T-ll T-12
6-14. Is any regional or supra-national security organization involved in this conflict
in an active supportive role on behalf of this antagonist?
1. Yes A A A I aa
2. No
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-l T-12
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6-15. Is any "greatpower" involved in this conflict in an active supportive
behalf of this antagonist?
role on
T T T T T
T-l1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12~
6-16. Is any "eon-great power" nation involved in this conflict in an active
role on SeFalf of this antagonist?
1 Yes
2. No
supportive
T-1a a A T
T-l T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-11 T-L.2
6-17. Is any autonomous or independent rebel, or insurgent or guerrilla force involved in
this conflict in an active supportive role on behalf of this antagonist?
1. Yes a A a *
,~ *7.*!~
2. No a2____I
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 Ti 12
6-18. Is an third party providing p t l dip c support on this antagonist's
behalf in the conflict?
f a a I9 -I I -I
2 _No a0
T-l T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-11 T-12
6-19. Is any third party pr6viding (non-military) e no dc support on this antagonist 's
bdhalf in this conflict?
1-1  T- T4 T-5 T-6 .1-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 -fl T-12
L_ Yes
2, No
1r Yes
1. Yes
2, No
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6-20. Is any third party supplying military advisory support to this antagonist in
this conflict?
1. Yes p a a a
2. No a a a
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
6-21. Is any third party supplying arms or military hardware to this antagonist in
this conflict?
1, Yes
2. No
a a * £ a a a £
T I a a a
T-l T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll .T-L2
6-22. Is an third party supplying organized conventional forces (i.e., manpower) to this
antagonist in this conflict?
1. Yes a a a
2. No a a a
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-11 T-12
6-23. Is an third party supplying guerrilla troops to this antagonist in this conflict?
1. Yes a a a a a a a a
2. -No a a aa
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
6-240 If any national third party is involved in an active supportive role on this antagonist's
behalf, indicate support of third party's public for its involvement in this conflict.
(Note: if more than one :such national third party is involved, answer in terms of
the ma contributdr to this antagonist's behalf):
Generally in favor
Generally against
NA (no national third
party involved)
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-1 T-12
1.
2.
3.
if n tionaI third party is invol ed in aiv supotive roLe on this
t behalf, indicate the type of d ic government or political
f t third p ty: ( No: if more han one such national thirdpt inIolved, answer in terTms of the mor contributor to this antag-
n nalf See Pa ge I for definitions T T ese categories)
1. Political Democracy
2. utelary Democracy
3. :odernizing Oligarchy
4. Totalitarian Oligarchy
5. T-aditional Oligarchy
i. national third
6J24b TIf any nation-l third part is involved i
antagonistS behalf, has there occurred
of rhiS ird party, or a change in its
r Ie than one such national third pa ty
contibutor to this antagonist ' s behaIf
Yes
No
NA (i.e.,
party
no national third
involved)
LA_
:~~~4 ~ .i 7Y_1 /PjO fIi11
ni an act ive support ive role on this
a cni, e. in the oolitical leadership
regime, during this Phase? (Note: if
is so inivolved,) answder in t&rms of to
1T
24c. I ny atio :a third party Is .inv 1'1v in an a
cr I a "Ft ;Jq
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6-24a. If any national third party is involved in an active supportive role on this
antagonist's behalf, indicate the type of domestic government or political
s.tructure of that third party:( Note: if more than one such national third
party is so involved, answer in terms of the major contributor to this antag-
onist's behalf. See Page 18 for definitions of these categories):
Political Democracy
Tutelary Democracy
Modernizing Oligarchy
Totalitarian Oligarchy
Traditional Oligarchy
NA (i.e., no national third
party involved)
*6-24b*
T3 T-4. T
I a aI . a a a S
p p a a
If any national third part is involved in an active supportive role on this
antagonist's behalf, has there occurred a change in the political leadership
of this third party, or a change in its regime, during this Phase? (Note: if
more than one such national third party is so involved, answer -in terms of the maor
contributor to this antagonist's behalf.)
Yes
No
NA (i.e., no national third
party involved) -
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 *T-8 T-9 -T- 10 T-11 T-.12
6-24c. If any national third party is involved in an active supportive role on this
- antagonist's behalf, indicate the orientation of the present political leadership
or ruling regime of the third party, in terms of its own current political
system style: (Note: if more than one such national ThTrd party is so involved,
answer in terms of the major contributor to this antagonist's behalf.)
Revolutionary
Liberal
Conservative
Traditionalist/Reactionary
N.A. (i.e., no third party)
a a 1aea
T T T
I a I a I
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
1.
2.
3.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
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If any national third party is involved in an active supportive role on this
antagonist's behalf, is the cost of this support causing severe strains or dis-
locations in the economy -of that third party? (Note: if more than one such
national third party is involved, answer in terms of the major contributor.)
1. Yes
2. No
3. NA (no national third
party involved)
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
6-26. If any national third party (or parties) is (are) involved in an active supportive
role on this antagonist's behalf, what percentage of the total capital investment
in this antagonist's economy represents holdings of this third party (parties)?
(Note: this question need.be answered for only that phase at which the third party
(parties) became involved in the conflict.)
1. Less than 5%
2. 5-15%
3. 16-33%
4. 34-66%
5. More than 66%
6. NA (no third party involvedi
or, antagonist has no
economy or economic assets
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-li T-12
6-2T, If any nonal third party (or parties) is (are) involved. in an active supportive
role on this antagonist's behalf, what percentage of the total exrts of this
antagonist's economy is consumed or claimed by this third party (parties): (Note:
this question need be answered onl for that phase at which the third party (parties)
became involved in the conflict,)
1. Less than 5%
2. 5-15%
3,, 16-33%
4. 34-66%
5. More than 66%
6. NA (no third party involved'
orantagonist has no
exports)
I tL- . A j A I
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6- i-7 T-A T-9 T-10 T-11 T-12
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6-28. Has this regime in the past been generally frustrated or gratified in making use of
available international machinery for peaceful settlement of disputes?
J. Generally frustrated
2. Generally gratified
3. No experience with such
TT
T-1-2 T-3 T-47Y T-5-T- 6 T- T- T9 T-0Tl -2
6-29. Does this regime feel that available international machinery for peaceful settlement
of disputes is applicable in this con itiTE
a a a a a a a a a a a
. - -- A A 9 A -4..
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-1
6-30. Has any thirdpart offered its offices to this party to arbitrate or adjudicate this
conflict?
I.Ye sA a a a a
T-l T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-1l T-12
6-31. Has any international organization (or official representative thereof) offered its
offices to this regime to arbitrate or adjudicate this conflict?
1. Yes A
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-l0 T-Il T-12
6-32. Has any ontona ranization (or official representative thereof)
offered its offices to this regime to arbitrate or adjudicate this conflict?
a k a I a I I~ I
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-1l T-12
1. Yes
2. No
1. Yes
2. No
a A A
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48.
6-33. Has any "great power" offered its offices to this regime to arbitrate or
adjudicate this conflict?
T-l- T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T8 T-9 T-10O T-1l1 T_ 12
6-34. Has this regime accepted or rejected any offer by any third party to arbitrate or
adjudicate this conflict?
1. Accepted
2. Rejected
3, NA (no offer made)
A A
T-l T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-l10 T-11 T-12
6-35. Has this antagonist's cause in this conflict ever been upheld by any resolution of
an international organization?
1. Yes p
2. No
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-li T-12
6-36. Has this antagonist's cause in this conflict ever been repudiated or indicted by
any resolution of an international organization.
Yes -- -. .e .I
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-l1 T-12
6-37. Has an international organization formally recognized with respect to this conflict
the violation by this antagonist of any of its obligations under international law?
1. Yes
No
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
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No
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6-38 Has this antagonist been cited by an international organization as having committed
act(s) of aggression in this conflict?
T - I _3 T T -a I
6-39. Has this regime accepted or rejected any settlement recommended or proposed for
this conflict by an internatjonloan ization?
Accepted
Rejected
NA (no settlement-offered) T-
T1T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T_-7_ T-8- T-_9 T-10"T-ll. T-!2
6-40. Has this regime declared its willingness to accept any cease-fire or armistice
proposed for this conflict by an inter-nationaL oranization?
T - 1T-l T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T- ll T-12
6-411. If an international organization has played any active role in this conflict has
this regime observed its recommendations and honored its decisions?
Gene-r41ly Yes
Geneally No
NA (i.e., no active role
by such) T- 1T-2 T-4 -5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T T-11 T- 12
6-42. Have Sanctions of a knykind been imposed by an international organization on this
antagonist for its stand in this conflict? ~
1. Yes
2. No
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-L T- r T-12
1. Yes
2. No
10
2.
3.
*. Yes
2. No
10
3.
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6-43. Have any political or diplomatic sanctions been imposed by an international
organization on this antagonist for. its stand in this conflict?
1. Yes 
- a a a a I
2. No A .
T-1- T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-l. T-12
6-44. Rave any economic sanctions been imposed by an international organization on this
antagonist for its stand in this conflict?
1. Yes a . p p
2. No a a I
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-1
6-45. Have any military (or armament) sanctions been imposed by an international organization
on this antagonist for its stand in this conflict?
1. Yes a a a.a
2. No p p p a a
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
6-46. If a regional or supra-national organization of which this antagonist is a member
has played any active role in this conflict, has this regime observed its
recommendations and honored its decisions?
1. Generally Yes
2. Generally No
3. NA (no active role by such)
a a aI
A A A _A
T T T T. T
T-l T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
6-47. Have sanctions of any kind been imposed by a regional or supra-national organization
on this antagonist for its stand in this confict.
1. Yes A A
2. No p a p a
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-11 T-12
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6-48. Have any political or diplomatic sanctions been imposed by a regional or suprq-
national organization on this antagonist for its stand in this conflict?
l Yes a Jjjjj...j
2. No. a I
T-l' T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T
6-49A Have any economic sanction been imposed by a regional or supra-national organization
on this antagonist for its stand in this conflict?
1. Yes A A-
2. No A
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
6-50. Have any military sanctions been imposed by a regional or supra-national organization
on this antagonist for its stand in this conflic
1, Yes a a
2, No I
T-l T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T--l T-12
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Note: In the questions in the following section which, deal with specific military hard-
ware capabilities (i.e., Q. 7-21 to 7-39), it is to be noted that weaponry "available
to all military forces in the conflict" include all such weapons currently at the dis-
posal-of the antagonist for use or deployment in this conflict (regardless of their
source)plus all such weapons with which any supporting third party forces are equipped.
7. MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF THE ANTAGONIST
7-1. Total number of active (i.e., non-reserve, militia, etc.) military troops in
this antagonist's own arned (ormilitary) forces, in thousands:
1.
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
7-2. Total manpower in the antagonist's active armed forces as percentage of the total
general population in its control or jurisdiction:
T-l T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-l T-12
7-3. Number of non-mobilized reserve or para-military force manpower available to this
antagonist, in thousands (include organized military reserve forces, civilian militia
forces, army-integrated police force, etc.):
1.T- T-
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
7-4. To what extent have the military reserve or para-military forces available to this
antagonist been mobilized for this conflict:
1. No mobilization at all
2. Token mobilization (less
than 10%)
3, Slight mobilization (10-25%)
4, Major mobilization (26-75%)
5. Total mobilization (over 75%)
6. NA (no such forces available)
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-L0 T-11 T-12
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7-5. Number of military troops in this antagonist's own armed forces actually
committed to or engaged in this conflict, in thousands:
ST2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 Y 9 T L TT 12
7-6. Number of this antagonist's own armed forces committed to or engaged in this conflict,
as percentage of the total active troops in its armed forces:
1 . T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9- T-10 T-l T-12
7-7. Percentage of this antagonist's general population mobilized for active military
service in this conflict: (Indicate NA if no general population)
T-1 T-2 T-3 T- T-5 T-6 iT-7 T T TT- T
7-8. Is there any internal threat to this regime from any adversary other than the
present one that requires it to maintain a significant part of Iit normal
military capabilities elsewhere than at the area(c) of immediate confrontation with
present adversary?
1. Yes
2. No
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-lO T-ll T-12
7-9. Is there an external threat from any real (or potential) adversary other than the
present one, that requir es this re'gime to maintain a significant part of its normal
military canabilities elsewhere than at the area(s) of immediate confrontation with
present adversary?
1 Yes
2. No
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-li T-12
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7-10, if _an such internal or external threat does exist, what percentage of this antagonist's
total (or normal ) military manpower capabilities is currently being allocated
or committed to this other threat ------- (i.e,, what percentage of its total mili-
tary manpower establishment is' diverted -from the present conflict thereby)?
(no such threat exists)
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-lO T-1l T- U.
7-11. Total number of military manpower supplied by third party (or parties) to this antago-
nist's cause in this conflict, in thousands:
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-1l T-12
7-12. "Visibility" or overtness of personnel supplied by third party (or parties) to
this antagonist's cause in the conflict (i.e., degree of secretiveness in this arrange-
iment between third party and antagonist);
1. Highly overt
2. Mostly overt
3. Mostly covert
4. Highly covert
50 NA (none supplied)
I p A p I I A
A I a a I A a
A a I a 1
A. a A A a a A
I I I a I I A A I I
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-lO T-l1 T-l2
7-13. Does this antagonist expect the number of troops available to it from third
""N party sources to:
1. Increase in the near future
2. Remain at its present level
(whatever that may be,
even zero)
3. Decrease in the near future
T-l T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-l10 T-ll1 T-l12
l.
2. NA
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7-14. Total military manpower coimitted to cr engaged in this conflict on this side
fle. total of this antagonist s own military forces plus any military forces
surrplied by third arty sources) in thousands:
T-1- T-2 T-3 T-4 T 5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-LO T 11 T 12
7-15. What percentage of the ttal military manpower committed to this conflict (i.e.,
antagonist's own forces Lius any third party forces) is constituted by this
antagonist's ovm military forces?
1. -__ _f I_ _ _ _
2. NA (no troops committed to
conflict) 
-
T-1 T-2 T T-3 T 4T-5 T6 -7 -8 -9T-10 T--11 T-12
7-16. Conventional army manpower in all military forces (i.e., antagonist's own
military forces plus all third party forces involved) committed to this conflict, in
thousands:
T-1 T-2 T-3 T 4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-11 T-12
7-17. Guerrilla or "Special Forces" manpower in all military forces committed to this
conflict, in thousands:
1.
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-1l T-12
7-18. Naval manpower in all military forces committed to this conflict, in thousands:
1- 213 -'+15' T- -7 T 8I- -0 ~l11
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7-19. Air Force manpower in all military forces committed to this conflict, in thousands:
1-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T 5 T-6 T 7 T-8 T 9 T-10 T 11 T-1.2
7-20. Trained medical personnel (doctors,- nurses, corpsmen) in all military forces com-
mitted to this conflict:
1.
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-l1 T-12
7-21. Number of rifles available to all military forces (i.e. antagonist 's own military
forces plus any third party forces involved) On this side in the conflict, in
thousands:
1. A A
T-l T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-l T-12
7-22. Numbeo of automatic weapons (including automatic rifles, sub-machine guns, and
machine guns available to all military forces on this side in the conflict, in
thousands:
1. t AIIAIA.
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T 9 T-10 T-11 T-12
7-23. Numbers of mortars (of any size) available to all military forces on this side in the
conflict, in thousands:
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T 9 T 10 T-ll T-12
7-24. Number of anti-tank weapons (including recoilless rifles, rocket launchers or
bazookas, and anti-tank missiles) available to all military forces on this side.
lin the conflict, in thousands:
1. T T
T-l T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
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7-25, Number of light cannon--cannon of caliber up to but not including 105 mm or 4.2 in.--
(does not incue mor tars) available to all military forces on this side in the
conflict:
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T 9 T-10 T-1l T-12
7-26. Number of medium cannon--cannon from 105 to 155 mm, or from 4.2 to 6 in. inclusive--
available to all military forces on this side in the conflict:
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T5T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9T-10 T-ll T-1
7-27. Number of heavy cannon--cannon of caliber over 155 mm or 6 in.-available to all
military forces on this side in the conflict:
1. -A
T-l T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-l T-12
7-28. Number of tanks and other armored vehicles available to all military forces on this
side ini the conflict:
1. L
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
7-29. N. ber of fighter aircraft, jet or prop driven, available to all military forces
on this side in the conflict:
T-l T-2 T-3 ~~4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
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7-30. Number of bomer aircraft, jet or prop driven, available to all military forces
on this side in the conflict:
T-l T-2 T-3 T- T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-lO T-ll T-12
7-31. Number of troop transpcrt aircraft--DC 3 or larger--available to all military
forces on this side~IK te conflict:
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
7-32. Total number of eet aircraft available to all military forces on this side in the
cEnilic t:
1.
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-1l T-12
7-33. Number of helicopters available to all military forces on this side in the conflict:
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
7-34. Number of surface-to-air missiles available to all military forces on this side
the conflict:
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T 9 T-10 T-ll T-12
35. Number of urface- to-srface dessis available to all military forces on this
side in the conflict:
1. T
T-l T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T 8 T-9 T-10 T 11 T-12
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7-36. Number of submarines available to all military forces on this side in the conflict:
T-l T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T- 9 T-L0 T 11 T-12
7-37. Number of heavy naval vessels (i.e., destroyers or above) available to all mili-tary
forces on this side in the conflict:
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-l T-12
7-38. Number of troop landing craft available to all military forces on this side in the
conflict:
1. T T T T
T-l T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T 11 T-12
7-39. Number of motorized, shallow draft torpedo or patrol boats available
forces on this side in the conflict:
1.T2
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T
7-40. Does this antagonist have its own nuclear capability?
I. Yes
2. No, and not seeking to de-
velop or acquire one
3. No, but seeking to develop
or acquire one
to all military
9 T-10 T 11 T-12
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
7-41. Is there any third party involved in this conflict
has a nuclear capability?
on this antagonist's behalf which
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
1. Yes
2. No
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7-42. To what extent is this antagonist currently dependent upon sources other than its own
local. procurenent capabilities for battlefield armaments (i.e., infantry weapons,
artillery, etc.)?
1. Exclusively dependent
(almost all)
2. 'Highly dependent
(more than half)
3. Somewhat dependent
(less than half)
4. Not dependent at all
(virtually none) T 1 T T T T
T-l T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T 9 T-l0 T-l T-12
7-43. If this antagonist is at all so dependent for battlefield armaments, does it
perceive the supply as likely to:
Increase
Remain about the same
Decrease
Stop
NA (not so dependent)
T-1lT-2 T-3. T-4 T 5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
7-44. To what extent is this antagonist currently dependent upon sources other than its
own local procurement capabilities for naval armaments?
1. Exclusively dependent
(almost all)
2. Highly dependent
(more than half)
3. Somewhat dependent
(less than half)
4. Not dependent at all
(virtually none)
5. NA (it has none)
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T 9 T-l0 T-ll T-12
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
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7-45. If this antagonist is at all so dependent for naval armaments, does it perceive
the supply as likely to:
Increase
Remain about the same
Decrease
Stop
NA (not so dependent)
I I a I 9 I I I I I p
a I a a S I p p
p p p p p 9 I. I
a a a a a a
I 9 BT-l T-2 .T-3 T-4 T-5 T 6 T-7 T-8 T~9 T-lO T-ll T-12
7-6 To what extent is this antagonist currently dependent upon sources other
own local procurement capabilities for air combat capabilities?
1. Exclusively dependent
(almost all)
2. Highly dependent
(more than half
3. Somewhat dependent
(less than half)
4. Not dependent at all
(virtually none)
5. NA (it has none)
than its
a a a I a
I 1p a I I
a I5. :
T-l T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-l0 T-l1 T-12
7-47. If this antagonist is at all so dependent for air
the supply as likely to:
Increase
Remain about the same
Decrease
Stop
NA (not so dependent)
capabilities, does it perceive
I aa a a
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
i~.
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-7-48. To what extent is this antagonist currently dependent upon sources other
own local procurementcapabilities for mechanized transport capabilities?
1. Exclusively dependent
(almost all)
2. Highly dependent
(more than half)
3. Somewhat dependent
(less than half)
4. Not dependent at all
(virtually none)
5. NA (it has none)
7-49. If this antagonist is at all so dependent for
does it perceive the supply as likely to:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Increase
Remain about the same
Decrease
Stop
NA (not so dependent)
"Visibility" or overtness of military hardware aid by third party (or parties) to
this antagonist's cause in the conflict (i.e., degree of secretiveness in this
aid relationship):
mechanized transport capabilities,
than its
Highly overt
Mostly overt
Mostly covert
Highly covert
NA (no such aid from
third party sources)
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
T-1 T-2 T-3 T 4 T 5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
- p I a a a
I a I I I
a B I I a B a
A A A B B I B I B.
B A A a A p A B I B
T-l T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-1O T-ll T-12
3.
4.
5.
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7-51. Has the third party (parties) also supplied sufficient and adequate spare parts
and ammunition for effective operation of the weapons provided?
1. Unfailingly
2. Generally
3. Only selectively
4. Generally not
5. Never
6. NA (no such aid from
third party sources)
J- 4
T-l T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
7-52. Has third party (parties) also provided that there be adequate training of this an-
tagonist's own mil. forces for the effective operation and use of these weapons?
1. Generally
2. Only selectively
3. Generally not
4. NA (no such aid from
third party sources)
T-
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T 6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-1ll T-12
7-53. What percentage of the total budget or expenditures for all military forces and
armaments committed to this conflict is being supplied~~by or' from third party
sources?
- I I a I T- T T T T 8 T
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T 8 T-9 T-10 T-11 T-12
1.
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8. STATS AN0D PERFORMAGNCE OF THE ANTAGONIST'S
MILITARY CAPABILITIES
neervene pI ol
ILI--
-. Supportcive (para-
charafter of I-i antgonst' own mititsary
itiCal power2 oiented
olitical supp;or t role)
Neutral (apoLitical, p oliical iportanc-e)
NA (i e., no such traditions)
Style ot I cuitct i to
I. Eltist (w<o iy ascriptive
criteria, as class, caste
party, eZc )
rgel y, but not
officer corps:
asI
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Characterize the unity within the officer corps of this antagonist's own armed forces,
with respect to goals and/or allegiances:
. Unified -- no politically sig-
nificant dissension
2. Factionalist -- politically
significant feuding or
dissension
1 1 .I I I I I I I i
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-11 T-12
8-5. If military manpower forces have been supplied by third party sources to this
antagonist's cause in this conflict, has this antagonist effectively relinquished
supreme command of the forces on its side in the conflict?
1. Yes
2. No
3. NA (no such third party
forces involved)
T-1 T-2 T-3T- T-T6 T-7 T- - -0T-11 T-12
8-6. Recruitment rate into the military from this antagonist's own population (rate at
which military force is being added to, in months):
T-l T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
7ry method of recruitMenl of this antagonist's own military forces:
1. V olu-an teer s (vounr y) _- r-
2. Conscription (oraft)
3. Mercensrie (foreJI or
4. , Imrsmnfre r tra
T-1T-2 T-3 T4T5 Th6 7 T-8 T-9 T 10 T-ll T-12
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8-8. Primary method of recruitment emplyed by thi-rdparty military forces on this side
(Note : if more than one third party is involved, answer for the major contributor):
1. Volunteers (voluntary)
2. Conscription (or draft)
3. Mercenaries (foreign or
domestic)
4. Impressment, -force, or threat
5. NA (no third party forces
involved)
'-4-~ '
I a I I
a a I
I a I a I I
T-l T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-l0 T-ll T-12
8-9. Training facilities for this antagonist's own military officers:
1. Generally good (at least
4 months, up to date
program)
2. Generally fair (less than
4 months, ad hoc program)
3. Generally poor ~(~ittle or no
formal training)
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T- T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
8-10. Training facilities for third part officers on this side in the conflict (Note: if
more than one third party is involved, answer for the major contributor):
1. Generwlly good (at least
4 i!onths, up to date
program)
2. Generally fair (less than
4 months, ad hoc program)
3. Generally poor~~(little or no
formal training)
4. NA (i.e., no third party
forces involved)
i I I I I i I I
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
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8-1. Training facilities for this antagonist's own enlisted (i.e., non-officer) military
personnel:
1. Generally good (at least
4 months, up to date
program)
2. Generally fair (less than
4 months, ad hoc program)
3. Generally poor (little or no
formal training)
T-i T-2 T-3 T- 4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-12 T-11 T-12
8-12. Training facilities for third ary enlisted personnel on this side in the conflict
(Note: if more than one third party is involved, answer for the major contributor):
1. Generally good (at least
4 months, up to date
program)
2. Generally fair (less than
4 months, ad hoc program) A_
3. Generally poor (little or no
formal training)
4. NA (i.e., no third party
force involved)
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T -5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
8-13. Overall balance confronting this antagonist, as compared to adversary, in terms of
military training, morale, organization, and efficienty (regardless of relative size
of orces on each side):
1. Very favorable
2. Favorable
3. Even
4. Unfavorable
5. Very unfavorable
I LLL
__________ 1.
I I
I I I I I I
I I I I I
I I A £ I
a aa aI A I
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
I 
I
 
I
D
a
 
h
l
a
 
l
I
 
E
l
 
E
l
a
 
l
I
E
U
a
 
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
 
a
P
 
A
I
'
68.
8-14. Do the military forces on this side in the conflict have adequate logistical
support to maintain efficient operations at their current level?
1. Generally yes
2. Generally no
3. NA (i.e., no hostilities)
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T 11 T-12
8-15. Do the military forces on this side in the conflict have adequate logistical
support to expand their current operations, if they so wish?
1. Generally yes
2. Generally no
3. NA (i.e. , no hostilities)
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T10 T-ll T-12
8-16. Overall strategic military hardware balance confronting this antagonist as compared
to adversary (as adjudged by this regime at this point):
1. Very favorable
2. Favorable
3. Even
4. Unfavorable
5. Very unfavorable
T-l T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-lO T-l T12
8 1 Characterize the military command of the forces on this side in the conflict:
1. Centralized (central direction
of operations)
2. De-centralized (autonomous
local control of
operations with minimal
central direction)
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-7TT-6T- T-8 T-9 -10 T-1l T-12
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8-18. Is effective sanctuary (i.e.,. inviolable withdrawal areas) readily available
in the conflict area(s) to the military forces engaged on this side?
1. Generally available to most
forces
2. Available to some forces,
some of the time
3. Generally not available to
most forces
4. NA (i.e., no hostilities)
a aa a I
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
8-19. Is this side using aerial bombing as a tactical weapon against its adversary in this
conflict?
1. Yes - day time only
2. Yes - night time only
3. Yes - both night and day
bombing
4. No
5. NA (i.e., no hostilities)
T-1 2-2 T-3 T-~T5T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9TlT-l-2
8-20. Use of terror tactics by the military forces on this side in the conflict:
1. Widespread-organized
2. Wides -ead-unorganized
3. Limied-organized
4. Limited-unorganized
5. Totally or nearly absent
T-1 T-2 T-3 TZi T-5 T- T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T -ll T-12
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8-21. Characterize the military tactics employed by the forces on this side in conflict:
1. Active or offensive
2. Passive or defensive
3. NA (i.e., no hostilities)
T-l -T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T--76 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-11 T-12
8-22. Characterize the military tactics employed by the forces on this side in the conflict:
1. Mobile or expansive
2. Static or stationery
3. NA (i.e., no hostilities)
8-23. Characterize the military
1. Tenacious in holding estab-
lished positions against
superior forces
2. Yielding in face of
superior forces
3. NA (i.e., no hostilities)
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
tactics employed by the forces on this side in conflict:
1 1
T T T T
1 lT2T3 T- *- T -7 T -_9 T.-1O T-ll T-12Z
8-24 Treatment of enemy prisoners by military forces on this side in the conflict:
1. Good (decent shelter, food,
medical care)
2. Fair (reasonable shelter,
food)
3. Poor (no shelter, no
medical care)
4. Brutal (regular killing,
atrocities, etc.)
5. NA (none taken)
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Treatment of military casualties suffered by the forces on this side
1. Excellent (field hospitals)
2. Good (extensive use of corps-
mnen., hospitals in.rear)
3. Fair (corpsmen, no hospitals
available)
4. Poor (no corpsmen regularly
available, no hospitals)
5. NA (no casualties)
in the conflict:
T-l T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
8-26. Is this side now waging a large scale (i.e. in terms of its own manpower availability)
uerrilla operation or war?
1. Yes
2. No
3. NA (i.e., no hostilities)
T-1 T-2T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-11 T-12
8-27. If large scale guerrilla operations are
stage or phase of guerrilla operations:
being conducted by this side, specify
1. Organization and consolidation
or regional base areas
2. Progressive expansion through
s-botage, terror, direct
action
3. Destruction of enemy in con-
ventional battle (while
terror and sabotage per-
sist)
4. NA (no such operations waged
by this side)
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8-28. Intelligence organization and effectiveness of this antagonist among the general
population in the area(s) of conflict:
1. Generally effective
2. Occasionally or frequently
effective
3. Generally ineffective
4 t 4
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-1l T-12
.:8-29 Intelligence. organization and effectiveness of this anta-gonist within the policy organs
of the adversary in this conflict:
1. Generally effective
2. Occasionally or frequently
effective
3. Generally ineffective
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
8-30. Extent or degree of sympathy between general populace and this antagonist's o
military forces:
Generally sympathetic
Generally antagonistic
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-l2
8-31. Extent or degree of sympathy between this antagonist's general populace and third
Party military forces involved on this side in the conflict:
Generally sympathetic
Generally antagonistic
NA (i.e., no third party
forces involved)
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
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8-32. Characterize the physical security of this antagonist's total civilian pop 'n. against
conventional attack or raids by asdversas regular military forces:
1. High - generally secure or
invulnerable
2. Moderate - vulnerable only
in certain specific and
limited areas
3. Low - generally vulnerable
4. NA (i.e., no civilian
population) T I - T T-8 9 1 -l
T-lT-2 T-3' T-4 T5 T-6 T-7 T8 T-9 T-l0 T-1 TJ
8-33. Characterize the physical security ot this antagonist's total civilian pop'n. against
guerrilla attack or terror action by forces controlled by adversary:
1. High - generally secure or
invulnerable
2. Moderate - vulnerable only
in certain specific and
limited areas
3. Low - generally vulnerable
4. NA (no civilian population)
- - I
_2T3_Sr4T5T - T-8 T-9 T-OT-l1 T-2
8-34. Chiracterize the physical security of this antagonist's total civilian pop'n. against
accidental or indicental attack by the armed forces on this side in the conflict:
1. High - generally secure or
invulnerable
2. Moderate - vulnerable only in
certain specific and
limited areas
3. Low - generally vulnerable
4. NA (no civilian population)
T-1 T-2 T___r-3 T-4 T T-T T- 89 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
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8-35. Characterize the physical security of this antagonist's toal civilian pop 'n. against
intentional attack or abuse by the police or armed forces onithis side in the
confct:
1. High - generally secure or
invulnerable
2. Moderate - vulnerable only
in certain specific
and limited areas
3. Low - generally vulnerable
4. NA (i.e., no civilian
population)
T-1- T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
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9. LOSSES DUE TO THE CONFLICT FOR ANTAGONIST
9-1. What percentage of its total industrial capacity at the end of Phase I has to this point
been lost by this antagonist due to the conflict (i.e., through destruction, sabotage,
or capture by the adver.sary)? Set T-1 equal to zero,
1.
2. NA (i.e., no industrial
capacity at P I)
1 a T T T T- T
a I a aI
T-l T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-1l T-12
9-2. What percentage of the total civilian population in its actual control or juris-
diction at the end of Phase I has to this point been lost by this antagonist (through
casualties, capture, detection, or control by adversary) due to this conflict? Set
T-1 equal to zero:
1.
2. NA (i.e., no civilian
population at P I)
-T T a a
I a a a I a
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-l0 T-ll T-12
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9_- Total number of this antagonist s total civilian population at the end of Phase I
hiTh have been lost to this point due to this conflict (i.e., lost through
casualties, capture, defection, or control by adversary). Set T-1 equal zero:
2. NA (no civilian population
at P I)
T-l T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T- 8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
9-4. Total attrition rate at this point for the civilian population in the control or
jurisdiction of this antagonist: total number of civilians lost (through casualties,
capture, defection, or control by adversary) per.month, at this point in the conflict:
1. a
2. NA (i.e., no civilian
population at this point)
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
9-5. Total number of casualties (i.e., killed or wounded) for this antagonist s own
military forces, to this point in the conflict. Set T-1 equal to zero:
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T 11 T-12
9-6. Total number of casualties (i.e., killed or wounded) for third party military forces
on this side, to this point in the conflict. Set T-1 equal to zero:
2. NA (no third party forces
involved at this point)
T-1 T-2 T-T-4- -T- 5 T-76' T-'7 T8T-9 T1 -lT1
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9-7. Total number of casualties (i.e., killed or wounded) for all military forces engaged
on this side, to this point in the conflict. Set T-1 equal~~to -zero:
T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-11 T-12
9-8. Casualty rate at this point for this antagonist's own military forces: number of
casualties (i.e., killed or wounded) per month at TIFs point in the conflict:
T-1 T-2 T-3 .T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
9-9. Casualty rate at this point for athird rt military forces on this side in the conflict:
number of casualties (i.e., killed or wounded) per month:
1.
-2. NA (i.e., no third par ty
military forces in-
volved at this point)
a T T T
T-l T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-ll T-12
9-10. Casualty rate at this point for all military forces engaged on this side in the
conflict: number of casualties (Te., killed or wounded) per month, at this point
in the conflict:
1. T-2 T3 T T T T
T-1l - T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-11 T-12
9-11. Total attrition rate at this point for this antagonist's own military forces: total
number of troops lost through casualties, capture, surren~der, defection, or desertion
per month, at this point in the conflict:
T-l T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-1l T-12
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? Total attrition rate at this point for third party forces on this side in the
conTctT total number of troops lost through casualties, capture, surrender,
defection, or desertion per month, at this point in the conflict:
1.
2. NA (i.e., no third party
forces involved at this
point)
T-I T T-4 T- 8 T9 T
P.-17 T-2 T-3 T-4 TV-5-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-11 T-12
9-13. Total attrition rate at this point for all military forces engaged on this side in
the conflict: total number of troops lost through casualties, capture, surrender,defection, or desertion per month, at this point in the conflict:
1.
T-1 T-2 T-3 P. T-5 T- T-7 T-8 T-9 T-1O T-11 T-12
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